By: Ricardo Abud
On May 14, 2026, in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, Xi Jinping opened his summit with Donald Trump with a question that was anything but rhetorical: "Can China and the United States overcome the so-called ' Thucydides Trap ' and create a new paradigm for great power relations?" [euronews]( https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/15/what-is-the-thucydides-trap-that-xi-invoked-in-his-meeting-with-trump )
Many interpreted Xi's words as a veiled threat, a warning wrapped in intellectual Latin. Others, like Trump himself, read it as an allusion to American decline. Neither interpretation captures what China truly meant.
The concept was popularized in the 2010s by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, who borrowed the name from the Athenian historian Thucydides. In his 5th-century BC account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides wrote: "It was the rise of Athens and the fear this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable." [The Hill]( https://thehill.com/policy/international/5877843-thucydides-trap-xi-jinping-china-trump-us-taiwan/ ) Allison applied
What's interesting is that this theory wasn't created by China or its intellectuals. It was developed in Cambridge, Massachusetts. And yet, it is Xi Jinping who most consistently invokes it, not to threaten, but to warn of a danger he considers very real and which, from the Chinese perspective, depends largely on Washington's decisions.
From the Chinese perspective, the problem isn't China's rise. The problem is the reaction that rise provokes in those who currently occupy the throne of global power. History, as they read it in Zhongnanhai (a complex of ancient imperial gardens located in the center of Beijing, adjacent to the Forbidden City), shows that wars aren't necessarily started by rising powers, but by established powers that feel their hegemony is being eroded and decide to act before it's too late.
China does not see itself as conquering Athens. It sees itself as a civilization that for two centuries was humiliated, partially colonized, and forced onto the periphery of the world order. Its return to the center is not, in Beijing's official narrative, a threat to the system, but a historical correction. And in that logic, the Thucydides Trap is a risk that stems not from a Chinese appetite for power, but from the American fear of losing it.
In his opening remarks, Xi also asked whether the two countries could jointly address global challenges and bring greater stability to the world, and whether they could forge a brighter future for bilateral relations for the benefit of their people and humanity. [The News]( https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1402512-xi-trump-summit-2026-can-us-china-escape-thucydides-trap ) That is not the language of someone who wants war. It is the language of someone
Trump responded on Truth Social by interpreting Xi's reference as a comment on American decline, attributing it to the Biden years. [euronews]( https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/15/what-is-the-thucydides-trap-that-xi-invoked-in-his-meeting-with-trump ) That response reveals exactly the problem: two leaders speaking the
Xi wasn't pointing to a declining America. He was posing a philosophical question about whether two powerful civilizations are capable of breaking a historical pattern that almost always ends in tragedy. In fact, the trap is not inevitable. Allison himself identified four cases out of sixteen where conflict was avoided, including the peaceful transfer of global leadership from Britain to the United States in the 20th century. [ euronews ] ( https://www.euronews.com/2026/05/15/what-is-the-thucydides-trap-that-xi-invoked-in-his-meeting-with-trump
China arrives at this summit noticeably more confident than in 2017, when it feared even a small increase in US tariffs. [CNBC]( https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/14/trump-xi-beijing-summit-trade-taiwan-ai-iran-rare-earths-tariffs.html )
The Chinese proposal is, in essence, simple yet politically complex: that the United States accept that the multipolar world has arrived, that China is not the Soviet Union, that its model is not seeking ideological export, and that competition between the two powers can coexist with cooperation in areas of common interest. From Beijing's perspective, insisting on containment amounts to actively pushing into the very trap that everyone claims to want to avoid.
Xi Jinping has been using this concept since 2014. It is not an improvised tactic or a last-minute provocation. It is a consistent political thesis: war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but neither is it impossible if decision-makers act out of fear rather than reason.
What became clear in Beijing was a telling asymmetry: while Trump emphasized friendship, trade, and "fantastic deals," Xi framed the relationship in terms of historical rivalry and potential conflict. [Fox News]( https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/chill-coming-trumps-summit-xi-proof-new-cold-war-china ) That difference in language is no accident. It's the difference between a president who thinks in terms of election cycles and a leader who thinks in terms
Thucydides' Trap is not a threat. It's a mirror. And what Xi asked Trump in the Great Hall of the People was, at its core, whether both countries are wise enough not to repeat the mistakes they already know by heart.
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