Trump's ego, Putin's tactics, and China's strategy

 


By Ruth Ferrero-Turrión* – Público.es

Trump needed a victory to bolster his narrative as a world peacemaker; Putin sought to recover the international legitimacy eroded by his war against Ukraine; and Xi Jinping aspired to something far more ambitious: demonstrating that no global power structure can be built without China. 

All three found Shenzhen a stage conducive to their interests, though not all emerged equally strengthened. Behind the Joint Declaration for Peace lies something far more significant than a diplomatic agreement between three powers, something as relevant as the written declaration of the will to redefine the rules of the international order, replace multilateralism with great-power diplomacy, and normalize a conception of sovereignty that shields the powerful from any demand for accountability. Peace thus appears less as a shared objective than as the instrument to legitimize a new distribution of global power.

If we analyze the declaration in detail, we see that while it contains some seemingly reasonable commitments, such as reducing nuclear risks, preventing proliferation, and reforming the United Nations, its true significance lies in its silences and some of its most troubling statements. One of these is undoubtedly Ukraine, one of the main issues addressed during the meeting, yet it isn't even explicitly mentioned. Peace in this text takes on a new meaning and is no longer framed as a matter of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, but rather as a problem of stability among major powers.

Nor is the commitment to increase oil production and supply innocent. In a context of profound energy instability, the three leaders seem to be betting on stabilizing markets based on fossil fuels, relegating the demands of the ecological transition to a secondary concern. In this sense, for Russia, it represents the possibility of reinforcing its role as an energy supplier; for the United States, an opportunity to contain prices and protect its economic interests; and for China, a guarantee of supply indispensable for its industrial development. Thus, immediate strategic interests prevail over long-term collective commitments.

But perhaps the most troubling element of the declaration is its questioning of international criminal justice, which includes strong criticism of the International Criminal Court and a defense of immunity for state officials. Presented under the argument of non-interference in internal affairs, this is seen as a direct attack on one of the most important advances in contemporary international law. This is not a technical discussion about the jurisdiction of a court, but rather a conception of power according to which those who govern states must be protected from external accountability mechanisms. But we already saw this in the joint declaration between Xi and Putin in 2022, just days before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At this point, the convergence of interests is more than evident. Because if Putin has an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, neither the United States nor China accepts the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the three find common ground in defending a sovereignty understood not as a guarantee of their citizens' rights, but as a protection for those who wield power. The consequence is clear: if international justice becomes an intolerable interference, impunity could end up being elevated to a principle of governance.

Each arrived in Shenzhen with different objectives. Trump sought to bolster his image as a great negotiator of world peace. His transactional view of international relations fits perfectly with a diplomacy of personal agreements between strong leaders, where multilateral institutions appear as obstacles and traditional alliances as burdens. After the political erosion of his first two years in office and the electoral setback in November, he needed to regain international prominence. The photograph with Putin and Xi allows him to present himself as the leader capable of bringing his adversaries to the negotiating table, even if the concrete results are considerably more modest than his ambitions.

Putin, for his part, pursued a fundamentally tactical objective: to regain international legitimacy without substantially altering his position on Ukraine. Sitting down with the US president and the Chinese leader, discussing world peace, and signing a declaration that questions international justice represents a considerable diplomatic victory for someone who remains responsible for a war of aggression. The Kremlin succeeds in shifting the debate from Russian responsibility to negotiations on European security, in which Moscow demands recognition of its strategic interests. It doesn't need to resolve the war to benefit from the meeting. It is enough to reinforce the perception that no solution will be possible without accepting Russia as an indispensable interlocutor.

However, the main symbolic winner in Shenzhen is likely Xi Jinping. While Trump pursues immediate results and Putin seeks tactical advantages, China is working on a long-term strategy. Beijing has managed to bring together the leaders of the other two major nuclear powers on its soil, presenting itself as host and guarantor of an international dialogue that no one can afford to ignore. It doesn't need to break its partnership with Russia or resolve its contradictions with Washington. It simply needs to demonstrate that the future of the international order necessarily involves China.

Thus, Shenzhen does not necessarily represent the birth of a new Yalta, but rather the normalization of a logic we thought we had overcome. A diplomacy in which peace can be negotiated without the victims, sovereignty can be invoked to guarantee impunity, and stability can be imposed at the expense of rights. The conclusion is obvious: Trump will have succeeded in feeding his ego, and Putin will have advanced his tactical objectives. But Xi may have achieved something far more important: placing China at the center of a new power architecture. And Europe? Europe is neither present nor expected.

*Professor of Political Science and European Studies at the UCM.

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